In the present-day society, which is often called a card-oriented society, a great number of different types of cards are widely propagated. Specifically, a cash card and a credit card issued by a credit company which are relating to the assets of property owners and a prepaid card as securities, and identification cards such as a driver's license, a health insurance card and a passport are widely used.
In many of the cards relating to property or securities and bonds, necessary information is written on a magnetic stripe disposed on the surface or on the rear surface of the card. By using automatic machines such as an ATM (automated teller machine) or a manual reading device, the magnetic information is read from the magnetic stripe, and various types of processing are executed.
FIG. 1 shows an example of a flow of processing the cash card currently in use.
(1) When an owner of a card inserts the cash card into a card slot of a terminal device such as an ATM, a sensor at the card slot senses the inserted card, and the card is taken into the device.
(2) When the card is taken into the device, the terminal device reads card information from a magnetic recording portion of the card. In case of a cash card, the card information such as a bank code, a bank branch code, a type of account, an account number, etc. is read. A card identification number, the expiration date, a type of account and an account number are recorded as the card information on the magnetic recording portion of a credit card. If a personal identification number is recorded on a cash card or a credit card, the personal identification number is also read.
(3) The terminal device judges whether or not the inserted card is a valid card, which can be handled by the terminal device.
(4) If it is not confirmed that the card can be handled by the device from the card information thus read, or if the information on the card cannot be read because the card is broken or stained even though the card is a valid card, the terminal device judges that it is an invalid card which cannot be handled and discharges the card.
(5) When the card is a valid card and when the information on the magnetic recording portion of the card has been read correctly, communication with a host computer starts.
(6) The host computer requests the inputting of the personal identification number.
(7) In response to the request from the host computer, the card user inputs the personal identification number.
(8) When the card user inputs the personal identification number in response to the request of the host computer, the host computer compares the inputted personal identification number with the personal identification number which is stored in the host computer and which corresponds to the card information thus read.
(9) If the numbers differ, this fact is recorded on the magnetic recording portion of the card, and the inputting of the personal identification number is requested again. In a case where the personal identification number inputted again is proper and valid, subsequent procedure is carried out. In a case where the inputted number differs from the stored number, the inputting of the personal identification number is requested further again. If erroneous inputting of the personal identification number is repeated three times, the card is invalidated and is, for example, taken into the terminal device as the result of invalidation procedure.
(10) In a case where the personal identification numbers are equal, the host computer judges that the card user is a legitimate card owner and requests the user to input the amount to be paid.
(11) The user inputs the amount which he(she) wishes to draw.
(12) When the amount to be paid is proper, the amount is paid and the cash card is discharged from the terminal device. Then, the payment is recorded on a bankbook, or a slip indicating the dealing is issued, and the processing finishes.
If the personal identification number is recorded on the cash card, the dealing is carried out under the assumption that the personal identification number is valid. Then, the personal identification number is erased from the magnetic recording portion.
FIG. 2(a) illustrates an example of the cash card used in the processing flow of the currently used cash card as shown in FIG. 1. The reference number 1 shows a cash card body made of a material such as plastics. On the surface of the card, a magnetic stripe 2 where information is recorded and an arrow mark 3 to indicate the direction to insert the cash card are disposed. Although not shown in the drawing, other necessary matters are entered thereon by embossed characters.
As information written in the magnetic stripe can be easily read by using a device called a skimmer, the card may be forged, and often causes damage by using the card thus forged.
To cope with this problem, an IC card incorporating a semiconductor memory has been used. Banks and other organizations have been making efforts to propagate this type of card to replace the magnetic card.
However, the information stored in the memory of the IC card is still possible to be read. If more elaborate forgery is attempted, we may not be able to say that the IC card is absolutely safe. In addition, the IC card is very expensive compared to the magnetic card, and it would be hard to expect the rapid propagation of IC cards.
In case of the cash card used in banks, it would suffice if the card can be used within the boundary of one country. However, in case of the credit card, the card is necessary to be used also in foreign countries. It is practically impossible to replace all of the credit cards, i.e. magnetic cards, used in the whole world with IC cards under unified standards.
Further, in cash cards and credit cards, the information such as the name of the card owner is marked by embossing, and these types of information are also used for the magnetic information. In this respect, the embossed information may be used as a clue or a key in the preparation for forging a card.
If the magnetic card or the IC card is lost or stolen, and if the card returned into the hand of the card owner, in particular, when the card owner does not aware of the fact of stealing, it is liable to cause damage by the use of the forged card.
A personal identification number, consisting of 4-digit numbers, has been used not for preventing cards from being illegitimately used by the prevention of the forgery but as the means to determine whether or not the card user is proper. Since assumable numbers have been often used for these personal identification numbers, there have been many cases of the loss and damage. In recent years, the personal identification number is stolen not only by assumption of it but also by peeping such as the means of stealthily taking a photograph of the personal identification number. It is now very difficult to prevent the illegitimate use of cards by using the personal identification number.
For the purpose of preventing the damage caused by the forged card, some adopts the biometric technique using the pattern recognition technology. The typical examples of the biometric technique are iris recognition, fingerprints recognition, palm-prints recognition, finger vein recognition, palm vein recognition, and hand-back vein recognition. For these recognition, it is necessary to register the pattern in advance. Time and procedures are required for the registration of the pattern, and also time is needed for the recognition of the pattern itself and for determining, and that results higher costs.
In case of the contact-type recognition, the user must come into direct contact with the detection device, and there arises a problem that the user may feel physiological repugnance or disgust. Also, in a case where the user has injury on the physical part necessary for the biometrical recognition, or in the worst case, where the user has lost the physical part to be needed for the recognition, it is impossible to use the biometrical recognition. Also, the recognition is partially made during the process of identifying, and accordingly, it is not a perfect method.
In the system using the biometrical recognition, the card user himself or herself can only use his or her own card. When the card user has not enough time to use the card personally or does not find a card processing device nearby, even if the user wants to entrust a representative or an agent to use the card, it is not allowed. This is very inconvenient for the user.
As one of the means for preventing the forgery, an embossed hologram is mounted to form surface irregularities on the plastic surface in case of credit cards, prepaid cards, securities, etc. This embossed hologram is very difficult to duplicate. In this respect, it is actually impossible to forge the card provided with the embossed hologram. In the current condition of the use, however, it is a person, who read the embossed hologram at a glance. Thus, it is possible that the card is forged by using the embossed hologram of similar type.
FIG. 2(b) illustrates an example of a credit card with the hologram, on which the card authentication is verified according to the human sense. The reference numeral 1 shows a credit card body made of a material such as plastics. On the surface of the card, a magnetic stripe 2 where information is recorded and an arrow mark 3 to indicate the direction to insert the credit card are disposed. Although not shown in the drawing, other necessary matters are entered thereon by embossed characters.
This credit card 1 is inserted into a terminal device with a portion with the arrow mark placed at the foremost position. Near the foremost portion on the card, an authentication verifying chip 4 consisted of, for example, an embossed hologram is mounted.
The magnetic stripe is disposed, unlike the cash card, on the rear surface of the credit card, but the direction to insert the card into the terminal device is the same. As a result, the direction to read the magnetic information on the credit card is reverse to that of the cash card.
In the authentication verifying chip 4, a pattern “A”, as an example, is confirmed by a person, who inserts the card into the terminal device, visually, i.e. by sensuous means, but is not read by the card terminal device.
The authentication verifying by sensuous means provides high effects in primary screening but its reliability is low because there are variations in the ability of each individual person who confirms and identifies or there are also variations in the identifying environment and psychological and/or physical conditions of the person.
The method for reading the embossed hologram pattern by machine can be roughly divided as a method for reading an image in a planar shape by means such as a camera; and a method for reading data in a linear shape by the combination of light emitting elements and light detecting elements. The method for reading the image in the planar shape is effective for verifying the authenticity, while the amount of information to be processed is large and the device for this method is more complicated.
The arrangements for reading data in the linear shape are disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication Nos. H06-124866, H06-318282, H07-220077, H09-319849, H11-180079, H10-143621, 2000-47557, 2000-48146 and 2002-74283.
According to each of the methods described in these references, the embossed hologram is read along a straight line in longitudinal direction of a rectangular shape card where the embossed hologram or a diffraction grating is formed. As a result, the device used is relatively simple in structure and it is easy to use, however, is less resistant to forgery.
In addition to the above references, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-272836 discloses an identification technique using a diffraction grating, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossed hologram and moire, and Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using embossed hologram and latent image.
The arrangements for reading data in the linear shape are disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication Nos. H06-124866, H06-318282, H07-220077, H09-319849, H11-180079, H10-143621, 2000-47557, 2000-48146 and 2002-74283.
According to each of the methods described in these references, the embossed hologram is read along a straight line in longitudinal direction of a rectangular shape card where the embossed hologram or a diffraction grating is formed. As a result, the device used is relatively simple in structure and it is easy to use, however, is less resistant to forgery.
In addition to the above references, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-272836 discloses an identification technique using a diffraction grating, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossed hologram and moire, and Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using embossed hologram and latent image.
When verifying the authentication by using an auxiliary tool, it is carried out by ultra-fine lines, special lines and micro-characters by using a screen with special shape, a magnifying device such as a magnifying glass or a special type filter generating optical interferences.
Practically, a light-emitting base material or a material having a special optical property such as a light-emitting laminated film, light-emitting ink, thermo-chromic ink, photo-chromic ink, etc., is mixed into the base material, laminated film or ink and the auxiliary tool of a special filter, a ultra-violet ray lamp, etc. is used. However, these are also low in reliability because recognition and identification are consequently relying on the human sense.
The authentication verifying by mechanical processing is to verify authenticity by mechanically detecting the property of the object material. The magnetic property and the optical property may be used for the detection.
Practically, a light-emitting material or a magnetic material is mixed into a base material, laminated film or ink and a detection device is used. Or, specific coded information is magnetically or optically added by using OCR characters or magnetic barcodes, and a magnetic or optical detection device is used.
In the authentication verifying by the mechanical processing, an artifact-metrics system using an artifact without having reproducibility, randomly arranged in a medium, is used instead of the information specific to the living body. This is described in “Financial Business and Artifact-Metrics” published by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, the Bank of Japan (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/044-12.pdf) and “The Patterns of Artifact-Metrics in Financial Field”; 6th Information Security Symposium (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2-6.pdf).
In the artifact-metrics system, a light reflecting pattern of granular substances, a transmission light pattern of optical fibers, a parallax image pattern of polymer fibers, a fiber image pattern, a magnetic pattern of magnetic fibers, a random-recorded magnetic pattern, a random magnetic pattern of a magnetic stripe, a random electric charge pattern of a memory cell, a resonance pattern of electrically conductive fibers, a resonance pattern of a vibrating seal, etc., which are formed by chance, are used.
As the matters subject to the illegitimate use or the forgery of the card, “the information of the descriptions of the card” added when the card is issued to a user and “the information of the card” given to the card in the manufacturing process are included. (“Handbook on the Technique to Prevent Forgery on the Surface of Affiliated IC Cards”, published by the National Printing Bureau, the Ministry of Finance (see: http://www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdf).
The information of the descriptions of the card is the information which is accorded and printed on the card body when issued to the user, and which is relating to the card issuance such as the card owner information, the period of validity, etc.
Falsification, which is a typical act of the illegitimate use of the card, is an act to alter all or a part of the information of the descriptions of the card, done by erasing the genuine information and adding illegitimate information.
The information of the card is the information of the card itself, other than the information of the descriptions of the card in the issued card. It is the information relating to the card body such as the physical shape of the card, background patterns applied to the card in pre-printing factory, printing layer on underlying layer and protected laminated layer, etc.
Forgery is an illegal act carried out for the card body. It is carried out by duplicating or imitating the design, patterns, etc., relating to the card body to forge a card, which is similar to the authentic card in the external appearance. Actually, the design, patterns, etc. on the surface of the authentic card are read by the means such as a scanner, which are then, edited or amended by using the means such as a printer.
Many types of techniques to prevent the forgery of the card body are known through combining the printing mode, types of ink, printing patterns, etc., only in the printing art, but no decisive technique is known yet at present.
The methods for authentication verifying to recognize and identify the forgery can be roughly classified as a method based on human sensuous ability; a method using auxiliary tools; and a method by mechanical processing.
In the authentication verifying by the human sensuous ability, the authenticity of a card is identified by the sensuous ability such as the visual sense, the tactile sense, etc. The means to identify by the visual sense includes colors of the card itself, a watermark and an embossed hologram, which changes the color and patterns provided on the card by changing the viewing angle. The means to identify by the tactile sense includes detecting the surface irregularities added on the card and detecting the texture of the card body itself. Actually, a logo mark, a special font, printing lines for preventing duplication, special color ink, embossed hologram, an optically changing material, a latent image pattern, etc., which are difficult to duplicate or copy and in which the authenticity of the card can be easily identified by the visual sense are used. And embossing, surface irregularities, perforation, etc. are also used, on which the authenticity can be identified by finger feeling or by the visual sense.
FIG. 3 shows a conventional example of a card, to which an authentication verifying chip of an artifact-metrics chip using metal granules is mounted as disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication no. 10-44650. FIG. 3(a) is a general view, FIG. 3(b) is a cross-sectional view and FIG. 3(c) is an enlarged view of the artifact-metrics chip.
In the card 1, the artifact-metrics chip 4 in thin-plate shape made of a light transmitting resin mixed with metal granules 5 is layered on a card base member 7, having a light non-transmitting property, which has an opening for the authentication verifying chip on it. And a non-transparent card surface plate 6 is further layered, in which a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow mark 3 are formed thereon and another opening is arranged at the same position as the opening on the card base member 7.
The metal granules 5 are mixed three-dimensionally in the transparent resin without regularity. As a result, the arrangement pattern of the metal granules 5 observed through the opening is inherent in each of the artifact-metrics chip 4. By utilizing these characteristics, a light to pass through the artifact-metrics chip 4 is photographed via the opening, and the arrangement pattern of the metal granules 5 can be observed. Therefore, it is possible to identify each individual artifact-metrics chip 4 and then, the card.
FIG. 4 shows another conventional example of a card, to which an artifact-metrics chip using fibers as disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2003-29636. FIG. 4(a) is a general view, FIG. 4(b) is a cross-sectional view and FIG. 4(c) is an enlarged view of the artifact-metrics chip.
In the card, the artifact-metrics chip 8 containing a mesh member 9 and short fibers 10 three-dimensionally mixed in a transparent resin is placed into an opening of the card base member 1, which has a non-transparent property and a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow mark 3 are disposed on the surface thereof. On the artifact-metrics chip 8, an interference pattern is generated by the pattern of the mesh member 9 and the short fibers 10.
This interference pattern is inherent in each of the artifact-metrics chip 8, i.e., in each card. By utilizing this characteristic, the pattern of the artifact-metrics chip 8 of the authentication verifying chip is photographed by a transmitted light or a reflected light for the card to be identified.
Mechanical reading of such the pattern of biometrics or artifact-metrics is generally performed by an image-pickup device and the result is identified by a pattern recognition technique. In this respect, there is a possibility that forgery can be made according to a duplicating technique.
The arrangements for reading data in the linear shape are disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication Nos. H06-124866, H06-318282, H07-220077, H09-319849, H11-180079, H10-143621, 2000-47557, 2000-48146 and 2002-74283.
According to each of the methods described in these references, the embossed hologram is read along a straight line in longitudinal direction of a rectangular shape card where the embossed hologram or a diffraction grating is formed. As a result, the device used is relatively simple in structure and it is easy to use, however, is less resistant to forgery.
In addition to the above references, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-272836 discloses an identification technique using a diffraction grating, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossed hologram and moire, and Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using embossed hologram and latent image.
As described above, the technique to determine the authenticity of the card itself is not yet firmly established, and a card, which cannot be forged, is not realized. Also, the technique to eliminate the use of a forged card is not yet realized.    [Patent Document 1] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H10-44650    [Patent Document 2] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2003-29636    [Patent Document 3] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H06-124866    [Patent Document 4] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H06-318282    [Patent Document 5] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H07-220077    [Patent Document 6] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H09-319849    [Patent Document 7] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-180079    [Patent Document 8] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-272836    [Patent Document 9] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H10-143621    [Patent Document 10] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2000-47557    [Patent Document 11] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2000-48146    [Patent Document 12] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2000-66567    [Patent Document 13] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2000-298880    [Patent Document 14] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-74283    [Patent Document 15] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-279480    [Patent Document 16] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2002-341733    [Patent Document 17] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2005-205897    [Non-Patent Document 1] “Financial Business and Artifact-Metrics” published by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, the Bank of Japan (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdf)    [Non-Patent Document 2] “The Patterns of Artifact-Metrics in Financial Field”; 6th Information Security Symposium (http://www.imes.boj.orjp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2-6.pdf)    [Non-Patent Document 3] “Handbook on the Technique to Prevent Forgery on the Surface of Affiliated IC Cards”, published by the National Printing Bureau, the Ministry of Finance (http://www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdf)    [Non-Patent Document 4] Nikkei Electronics; No. 883